Will Israel attack? lamissuesforum

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: The conventional wisdom is that Israel’s latest rightwing government, when not insulting Turkish diplomats and killing Palestinians, is preparing to attack Iran to take out its nuclear capability. How realistic is that option, and what would the implications be for the U.S. and the world? The ever-active, pro-Israel lobby in Washington is busy laying the groundwork for the action. Here is their explanation:

Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions are ominous in light of its hostile foreign policy and longstanding sup port for terrorism. But Iran's repeated threats to annihilate the state ofIsrael while it develops the world's most dangerous weapons have created an even more explosive situation. If diplomatic efforts to defuse the situation fail, Israel may see no other choice than to launch a preventive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.

DESTABLIZING: The U.S. would almost certainly be drawn into an Israeli-Iranian conflict. The Obama Adminis tration must start planning now to counter and minimize the destabilizing consequences of an expected Iranian backlash. In a new study, the conservative Heritage Foundation’s James Phillips says that to mitigate the threats posed by Iran to U.S. national security and to protect U.S. interests, Washington must:

 Recognize Israel's right to take action in self-defense; Prepare for a violent Iranian response to a preventive strike, including preparations for a possible U.S. war with Iran; Deploy missile defenses to defend Israel from Iranian missile attacks; Enhance deterrence against Iranian attacks by making it clear to Iran's leadership that such attacks will make a bad situation worse; Work with allies to take precautions to miti gate the impact of a possible Iranian-instigated oil crisis; Block arms sales to Iran; and Veto any U.N. Security Council resolution that does not acknowledge Iran's provocations and continued defiance of U.N. Security Council res olutions on the nuclear issue.

 NOT SUICIDAL: That’s a pretty long and ambitious list, and many cooler foreign-policy experts would suggest that instead the U.S. simply tell Israel not to attack anyone – and let the Iranians realize that the use of nuclear weapons is a non-starter in any case. Any Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would kill everyone in the neighborhood and even most of Teheran’s mullahs are not yet suicidal.

So far, Israel has acceded to the Obama Administration's engagement strategy despite having strong doubts that it will succeed. Israeli leaders have stated their preference: that the Iranian nuclear weapons program be halted by diplomacy -- backed by punishing sanctions. But they warn that they must regard the use of force as an option of last resort.

Israel has repeatedly signaled a willingness to attack Iran's nuclear sites if diplomacy fails to dis suade Iran from continuing on its current threatening course. The Israel Air Force staged a massive and widely publicized air exercise over the Mediterranean Sea in June 2008 in which Israeli warplanes, refueled by aerial tankers, simulated attacks on targets that were more than 870 miles away, approximately the same distance from Israel as Iran's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.

 LONG DISTANCE: Lt. General Dan Halutz, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces in 2006, when asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran's nuclear program, replied simply: "Two thousand kilometers."

Last year, Israeli officials leaked the details of a secret Israeli air attack against a convoy transport ing Iran-supplied arms in Sudan that was headed for Egypt's Sinai Peninsulato be smuggled through tunnels to Hamas. The officials stressed that the long distances involved signaled Israeli prepared ness to launch aerial operations against Iran.

 The government of Israeli Prime Minister Ben jamin Netanyahu has sent even stronger signals since entering office last March. In an interview con ducted on the day he was sworn into office, Netan yahu warned that, "You don't want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran."

COMMANDOS: Significantly, both Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, for merly served as commandos in the Israel Defense Forces and would be open to bold and risky action if the circumstances warrant it, Phillips’ study continues.

From May 31 to June 4, 2009, Israel staged its largest country-wide civil defense drill, which simulated widespread missile attacks. In late June, an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine transited the Suez Canal for the first time to deploy in the Red Sea, and two Israeli Saar-class warships followed in July. An Israeli official warned that if Iran failed to halt its nuclear program, "These maneuvers are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on its threats."

The high-profile transits of the canal also signaled that Egypt, which shares Israeli concerns about the threats posed by Iran, particularly after the discovery of a large Hezbollah cell operating in Egypt, is willing to cooperate with Israel to defend against threats posed by Iran. The head of Mossad has also reportedly met with Saudi officials and assured Prime Minister Netanyahu that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli warplanes passing through Saudi air space to strike Iranian targets.

UNPRECEDENTED: An Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would not be unprecedented. Israel has launched preventive air strikes at nuclear facilities developed by hostile states in the past. In June 1981, Israel launched a successful air strike against Iraq's Osiraq reactor and inflicted a major setback on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

In September 2007, Israel launched an air strike against a nuclear facility in Syria that was being built with North Korean assistance. The Israeli warplanes penetrated Syrian air defenses--which were more formidable than the air defense systems currently protecting Iranian nuclear sites--with little apparent problem.

Israel probably can only delay, not halt, Iran's nuclear program. Nevertheless, Israeli leaders may conclude that buying time is worth the considerable costs and risks of Iranian retaliation because Israel perceives a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. Israel is a small country that would be dev astated by a single nuclear explosion.

EXTENSIVE CAMPAIGN: It would take an extensive air campaign, probably including more than a thousand sorties over several weeks, to increase the certainty of destroying the bulk of Iran's known nuclear infrastructure. But Israel does not have enough warplanes and refueling capabilities to sustain such an intensive cam paign against such distant targets over a prolonged period of time, especially if the countries located between Israel and Iran (Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) object to Israeli use of their air space, as they undoubtedly would, at least publicly.

Nevertheless, Israel could opt to launch a single surprise attack at a limited number of key facilities to disrupt the Iranian nuclear weapons effort. The overall success of such a mission would depend on the quality of Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear facilities, the capabilities of Iran's air defenses, the accuracy of the strikes and the capability of Israeli ordnance to penetrate hardened targets. A single wave of attacks would not bring lasting benefits; Israel would have to launch multiple follow-up strikes to inflict higher levels of damage on Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

BUYING TIME: From Israel's perspective, buying even a small amount of time to postpone an existential threat is a worthwhile endeavor. The 1981 strike on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor did not end Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts, but it paid large dividends because Saddam Hussein's regime never was able to replace the reactor. Iraq's nuclear program suffered further setbacks due to U.S. air strikes during the 1991 Gulf war and the U.N. sanctions that followed after Iraq refused to abide by the subsequent ceasefire.

An Israeli military operation that delayed the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran also would have the benefit of delaying the prospective cascade of nuclear proliferation that would acceler ate a nuclear arms race among other states threat ened by Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, which would further destabilize the tense region and immensely complicate Israel's security environment.

WELL HIDDEN: An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would be a much more difficult and complex operation than the 1981 raid on Iraq's Osiraq reactor. The Iranian dictatorship learned the lessons of Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor: The Iranian nuclear infrastructure is more decentralized, dispersed, hardened, and protected than was Iraq's nuclear program.

Some of the nuclear sites have been located in cities, which would magnify the collateral casualties of air strikes. Other sites have been built deep underground with assistance from North Korea, which has developed world-class tunneling technology.

TABOOS: Israel may not have the specialized "bunker buster" ordnance necessary to destroy some of the hardened facilities buried deep underground. But the Israelis may strike the entrances of the underground facilities to shut them down, at least tempo rarily. Israeli warplanes could destroy nearby power plants to deprive some of the facilities of the electri cal power necessary for their operation. The Israeli air force also has trained to destroy Iranian targets by using low-yield nuclear weapons. But it is doubtful thatIsrael would break the nuclear taboo unless Iran first launched ballistic missile or air attacks with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons of mass destruction.

Israeli strikes are likely to be hampered by long distances to targets and the need for extensive air-to-air refueling from slow-moving aerial tankers. Iran's air defenses, which rely on quantity rather than quality, probably would pose a limited threat to Israeli warplanes, which have sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities.

HIGH RISK: But improvements in Iranian air defenses could make air attacks much riskier. Israel's window of opportunity for launching an air strike could soon close if Iran acquires more sophisticated air defense missiles, such as the S-300 surface-to-air missile that it has long sought to pur chase from Russia. The delivery of this system, which can track up to 100 targets and engage up to 12 targets simultaneously within a 120-mile range, could greatly complicate an Israeli air campaign.

The timing of an Israeli attack would also be determined by estimates of when an attack would no longer be effective. Israeli analysts reportedly believe that Iran now has enough low enriched uranium that it could further enrich to build a bomb in about 10 months, but that after another year of uranium enrichment it would only need half that time to build one.  Clearly the clock is ticking not only for Iran's nuclear program, but for Israel's preventive option.

IRAN’S REACTION: Iran's retaliation for an Israeli strike is likely to be fierce, protracted, and multi-pronged. Iran is likely to bombard Israel with its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles, possibly armed with chemical, biological, or radiological warheads. Such a missile barrage would amount to a terror campaign, similar to the "war of the cities" during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, when the two adversaries launched hundreds of SCUD surface-to-surface missiles at each others' cities.

USING PROXIES: Possible suicidal air attacks, per haps launched from bases in Syria, or attacks by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), based in Leba non, Syria, or ships off Israel's coast, could not be ruled out. In addition to direct attacks on Israel, the Tehran regime is likely to launch indirect attacks using a wide variety of surrogate groups, such as Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, all of which are armed with Iranian-supplied rockets.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist organization created in 1982 by Iran to oppose the Israeli intervention in Lebanon and support Iran's Islamist revolution, continues to receive arms, training, financial sup port, and ideological leadership from Iran's radical regime through the Revolutionary Guards.

Iran has completely re-equipped Hezbollah since its 2006 war with Israel in direct violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Hezbollah has received longer-range and more lethal Iranian rockets that would threaten many more Israeli civilians than during the 2006 war. Iran also has armed Hamas with increasingly sophisticated long-range rockets. Recently, Israeli military officials disclosed that Hamas has acquired an Iranian-supplied rocket capable of striking Tel Aviv, Israel's largest city, from Gaza.

Terrorist attacks on Israeli targets outside Israel, as well as against Jewish communities abroad, would also be near-certain. Iran was involved in the 1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires bombings of the Israeli embassy and a Jewish NGO. Iran could activate Hezbollah sleeper cells to attack Israeli targets not only in the Middle East, but in South America, North America, Africa, Asia, and Europe.

AMERICAN TARGETS: Tehran could also attack American interests in the region in retaliation for an Israeli strike. Despite the fact that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have opposed an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, the conspiracy-minded Islamist regime may presume the existence of at least tacit American sup port for an Israeli attack.

Iran could target American soldiers in Iraq by escalating its support for proxy groups such as the Mahdi Army or by infiltrating more elements of the Revolutionary Guards into the country to attack Americans directly. The Iranian regime could increase the supply of sophisticated improvised explosive devices, such as the lethal explosively formed projectile (EFP) mines that are capable of penetrating even the heaviest armor.

It could also foment more trouble for the U.S. in Afghanistan by inciting Shia Afghans against U.S. forces, renewing its support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi Islami (Party of Islam) forces, or throwing its weight more forcefully behind the Taliban. Tehran has already provided limited quantities of arms and supplies to the Taliban.

WORLDWIDE: American military, diplomatic, and government personnel, as well as civilians, would be put at risk of Iranian-supported terrorist attacks throughout the world, particularly in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to using surrogates, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iran may also upgrade its arms-length relations with the al-Qaeda terrorist network and give it more sup port beyond the sanctuary and cooperation that it has already provided.

International Reactions are anybody’s guess. Moscow would be the big winner of an Israeli-Iranian war. Russia has invested heavily in cultivating a strategic alliance withTehran that has given it a lucrative export market for its nuclear, military, and other technologies and a useful ally for contesting American influence. Russia also stands to accrue substantial economic benefits from the spike in world oil prices.

Beijing is likely to protect its growing economic, energy, and geopolitical investment in Iran by firmly supporting its ally at the Security Council and pushing for a denunciation and possi ble sanctions against Israel. Publicly, most Arab countries would denounce an Israeli preventive attack, but most, with the exception of Iran's ally Syria, would privately welcome the attack. Even if it did not permanently prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb, it could divert Iran from threatening its smaller Arab neighbors.

OIL PRICES: Most European states, with the possible exception of Britain and France, would likely criticize Israel for launching its attack. Many European states would suffer adverse economic consequences from the resulting spike in world oil prices.

Despite the diplomatic efforts of several U.S. Administrations, Iran has repeatedly rejected offers to permanently defuse the long-simmering confrontation over its illicit nuclear weapons program. The Obama Administration has sweetened the offer and sought to engage Iran diplo matically without any results. Diplomacy backed by timid U.N. Security Council sanctions is not likely to dissuade Iran from continuing its nuclear weapons program.

Isolated internationally and stripped of any semblance of legitimacy at home, the regime now has an even greater incentive to fin ish its nuclear weapons project to ensure its own survival. Iran's hard-line leaders see a nuclear capability as a trump card that will deter foreign inter vention and give at least a modest boost to their shrinking base of popular support. Negotiations are useful to the regime for buying time and staving off more international sanctions, but Tehran will obstinately resist international efforts to persuade it to halt uranium enrichment.

Phillips wants the administration to prepare contingency plans and deploy sufficient forces to protect U.S. military forces and embassies in the Middle East; defend allies, oil facilities and oil tanker routes in the Persian Gulf; and target Iranian ballistic missile, naval, air force, and Revolutionary Guard forces for systematic destruction.

ARMS SUPPLIES: He notes that the Pentagon has already deployed sophisticated X-Band radar to Israel to support several different types of American and Israeli missile defense interceptors. Israel has already deployed the Arrow and the Patriot PAC-3 missile defense systems. In addition, he wants the U.S. to make preparations to deploy or transfer to Israel the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and sea-based or land-based versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) inter ceptors. And he wants to deploy U.S. Navy Aegis-class warships off the coasts of Israel in the event of a crisis to help defend against a possible Iranian ballistic missile attack.

But that is just what the hawks in Israel want to hear. Even Israel’s best friends in Washington concede – as Phillips himself does – that there is no strong likelihood that attacks on Iran will work, and that the consequences could be devastating. Yet they are still hard at work justifying Israeli aggression before the fact – a tried and true tactic of the Israeli lobby and one that usually accurately predicts the next act of war.